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The purpose of this study was to investigate the role of 
self-concept as a variable in the resolution of cognitive dissonance 
arising from imbalances in interpersonal relationships. According 
to Festinger (1957)* cognitive dissonance is a state where there 
exists within the person "logical" inconsistencies between certain 
cognitive areas. The main hypotheses of the system state that (a) 
the presence of dissonance motivates the person to reduce it, thereby 
achieving consonance, and (b) when dissonance is present the person 
will avoid situations and behaviors which will increase it.
When inconsistencies exist in the way one individual regards 
the other in a diadic interpersonal relationship, efforts are made 
by the individual to resolve these inconsistencies. This is consistent 
with the imbalance theory formulations of Fritz Heider (19^6, I95S). 
Heider feels that there is a tendency toward balanced states in 
human relationships. He defines a balanced state as a situation in 
which the relations among the entities fit together harmoniously 
and in which there is no stress towards change. Thus, if a person 
(P) likes object X, and another person (0) either likes or "belongs 
with" object X, P will tend to like 0. For example, if Bill is a 
good friend of Tom, and Fred is a good friend of Tom too, Bill will 
tend to like Fred. If P dislikes object X, P will tend to dislike 
person 0. In this case if Bill dislikes Tom, and Fred likes Tom,
Bill will tend to dislike Fred. In the case in which 0 and X are 
seen to be in a negative relationship, it is expected that P will 
tend to feel negative toward X if he is positive toward 0, or 
positive toward X if he is negative toward 0. Here, if Fred dislikes 
Tom, Bill will dislike Tom if he likes Fred, and will like Tom if 
he dislikes Fred. Beliefs about another person becone balanced or
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stabilized when the three signs involved in the belief (P towards 0,
P towards X, and 0 towards X) are either all positive or two of the 
three are negative. If one or three of the signs are negative in 
such a set of three signs, the relationship will be unstable. When 
a person experiences an unstable interpersonal cognition (inconsistency 
between beliefs and feelings) he will attempt further cognitive 
operations until such sign changes are achieved to allow the cognition 
to become balanced or stable.
A balanced state can be achieved by resolving imbalance in such 
a manner as to maintain or establish a positive interpersonal relation­
ship. A balanced state can also be achieved when a previously positive 
interpersonal relationship becomes negative after the introduction of 
dissonance.
Neuringer (1963) has dealt with resolutions of dissonant 
infoimation concerning interpersonal relationships. In Neuringer’s 
study, previous positive attitudes towards an individual were changed 
to negative perceptions. Three groups of subjects were utilized.
'They were (l) a group of individuals that attempted suicide, (2) 
psychosomatic patients, and (3 ) normal hospitalized patients.
Neuringer’s hypothesis was that suicidal individuals change their 
perceptions of the other member in a diadic relationship to a much 
greater degree than (l) other emotionally disturbed people, and (2) 
normal subjects. Five situations reflecting interpersonal crises 
were used. In each situation it was arbitrarily established that an 
imaginary person was a good friend of the subject. Then disruptive 
material about the friend was introduced and the subjects were asked 
to rate their degree of friendship for the other person after receiving 
the new knowledge. The difference between the initial arbitrarily 
established degree of friendship and the degree of friendship after 
the disruptive material was introduced, constituted the amount of shift 
in attitude for the subject on that particular situation. It was 
found that suicidal and psychosomatic subjects adapted a view which 
indicated that they now had a more negative feeling toward the other 
person in the diadic relationship than aid normal subjects. Neuringer
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raised the point that resolutions of cognitive dissonances may he 
linked very strongly to personality variables.
Janis (195^) investigated personality adjustment factors in 
relation to individual differences in susceptibility to persuasion.
A group of 78 male college student s were divided into categories of 
high, moderate, and low persuasibility on the basis of their opinion 
changes following exposure to three persuasive communications. Data 
were obtained on the personal adjustment of the subjects from personality 
inventories. Control observations were made on an additional group of 
28 students who were not exposed to the communications. It was found 
that students who manifested feelings of social inadequacy, inhibition 
of aggression, and depressive tendencies were high in persuasibility, 
and students whose personality inventories indicated neurotic anxiety 
and. obsessional symptoms were low in persuasibility.
In another study, Janis (1955) obtained three different anxiety 
measures from a group of 53 male college students. 3ach of these 
anxiety scores was then studied in relation to a behavioral measure 
of persuasibility obtained by observing the opinion changes made 
by the subjects after being exposed tc a series of five persuasive 
communications. The hypothesis that persons with a high degree of 
neurotic anxiety are predisposed to be relatively resistant to 
persuasive communications was not confirmed. The hypothesis that 
persons with relatively strong feelings of persona] inadequacy are 
predisposed to be relatively highly influenced by persuasive communi­
cations was confirmed. An additional finding was that subjects with 
low test anxiety were more likely than subjects with high test anxiety 
to resist being influenced.
Festlnger, Scbachter, and Back (1950) studied the relationship 
between conforming attitudes and group affiliations among people 
living; in a large housing project. They found that those people who 
held deviant opinions tended to be social isolates in that they were 
much less involved in community activities, had. fewer friends in 
adjacent houses, and had fewer social contacts with others in the 
entire neighborhood. It was concluded that persons who display 
social withdrawal tendencies' are less likely than others to be 
influenced by persuasive communications from sources in the community.
bThe available evidence seems to point out that there is a 
relationship between changeability of attitude and social withdrawal, 
psychoneurotic complaints, and feelings of aggression. These studies 
seem to show that in a variety of situations high persuasibility is 
associated with feelings of social and personal inadequacy. This would 
tend to suggest that persons of low self-concept are more highly 
persuasible cnan persons of high self-concept.
However, in terms of cognitive dissonance theory, Bream, and 
Cohen (1962) have recently pointed out that the relationship between 
self-esteem and attitude change may be different from that suggested 
by the existing body of work on communication and attitude change.
They suggest that the personality variable of self-esteem is complex 
and many-sided, arul besides containing components of social withdrawal, 
and feelings of inferiority and inadequacy, can also be regarded as 
encompassing some dimensions of ego-strength and resistance to 
vulnerability. Ere hr. and Cohen reason that a person of high self- 
esteem is accustomed to thinking of himself as having integrity and 
as having opinions which are correct and true more than those of a 
low self-esteem person. .v vetoret when & high self-esteem person 
is presented with a communication which attempts to change M s  present 
beliefs, and the person agrees to consider contrary information, he 
should experience more dissonance than a low self-esteem person and 
consequently change his existing attitudes more to regain cognitive 
balance. Similarly, according to dissonance theory, a person of low 
self-esteem has characteristically been shaken in his convictions 
and had his opinions questioned often, and would therefore experience 
less dissonance and change his attitude less, when he is induced to 
expose himself to counterpropaganda or to adapt a discrepant stand.
'Two recent experiments involving the production of dissonance through 
discrepant commitment lend support to the reasoning of Brehm and 
Cohen.
Gerard (cf. Brehm & Cohen, 1962) conducted an experiment in 
which raise information about line judging ability was fed to 
college students. All the subjects went through a preliminary 
Asch-type line judgment situation and were then informed, on »:< 
random selection basis.!, that they either had a high ability or a
c;s
low ability in this area. It is assumed by the writer that the subject 
then had law and high self-concepts as far as their line judging 
ability was concerned. The subjects were then put into experimental 
situations where electrodes were taped on their arms. These electrodes 
led to counters which were visible to the subject. He was then told 
that hio thoughts and especially his judgments about line lengths 
would be picked up on the counter. Actually the counters were completely 
controlled by the experimenter.
The subject found himself in a room with two other students 
who were to take part in the experiment. However they were "stooges."
The objective length of the lines could be easily judged by 
the subject. However the two stooges gave either two obviously 
identical and incorrect judgments or two identical correct judgments.
The subject was asked to make his judgment after the stooges. The 
counter was manipulated by the experimenter;, so that it moved in a 
manner that was disparate with the stooges' judgments. If they gave 
an obviously wrong judgment, the subjectSs counter indicated that he 
agreed. If they made a correct response, the subject's counter was 
manipulated to show him that he disagreed. Thus dissonance was 
set up between his high opinion of Ills ability and the incorrect 
judgments which he thought he was giving.
Gerard predicted that the dissonance experienced by the high 
self-concept subjects would be greater than for the low self-concept 
subjects, and the gap between the subject and the group would be 
greater. On a second conformity task, the high self-concept subjects 
conformed more than trie low self-conccpt subjects.
Gerard’s predictions were upheld by the results of the experi­
ment. It appears that the high self-concept subjects were able to 
reduce the dissonance between their "behavior" and their cognitions 
about themselves by increasing their attraction to the group to which 
they presumably "conformed*" Gerard's data, then, illustrates that 
high self-concept individuals exhibit more attitude change than low 
self-concept individuals, so that cognitive dissonance can be reduced 
and a balanced state re-established.
Bramel (1962} did a study designed ;o investigate the use of 
projection as a mode of dissonance reduction. Male college student 
subjects were told that the first part of the experiment was designed 
to discover what kinds of people had insight into themselves. The 
subjects were asked to take a number of personality tests that, they 
were told, would be analyzed by clinical psychologists. The subjects 
were told they would learn the "results" in an interview, during which 
their self-insight would be measured. About a week later, the second 
part of the experiment was held. The subjects were told that this 
part of the experiment was concerned with forming impressions of 
personality and that they would be asked to make some judgments about
another subject. The two subjects were introduced to one another
•f* to to. asked 6fetch a •set of questions about himself and
his attitudes toward certain current events in order to let each 
subject gain some impression of the other in preparation for a later 
measurement ox their attitudes toward each other. The subjects were 
then separated and given the "results" of the previously taken 
personality tests. The "results" the subjects received, however, 
were prepared with no reference to their actual performance. There 
were only two test reports given, one vexy favorable and one very 
unfavorable. One subject of each pair wee randomly assigned to the 
favorable condition and the other was assigned to the unfavorable 
condition. The self-esteem of one subject was thereby experimentally 
enhanced, while the self-esteem of the other was reduced. After the 
two subjects had received their results, they were seated at a table 
so that each bad a galvanometer in front of him and the subjects 
could not see the other's galvanometer dial. Next the subjects 
were asked to make some judgments of each other, using 1 1 adjective 
scales. Then a self-concept measure, consisting of lb polar adjective 
pairs, was given each subject so that the effectiveness of the 
experimental manipulation that had attempted to influence their 
level of self-esteem could bo checked. Then the experimenter 
explained to the subjects that psychologists were interested in 
whether or not people could estimate "deeper and more personal 
aspects of the personality" on the basic of a first impression.
and that this part of the experiment would be concerned with the per­
cept ion of sexual arousal. Sacn subject's task was to look at a 
series of photographs of men and observe his own sexual-arousal 
responses on his gdvanoaeter. After recording his own arousal 
level for a given picture, each subject was supposed to estimate 
the dial indication of the other subject’s apparatus for the same 
picture. The subjects were told that movements of the dial indicated 
homosexual arousal to the photographs, Uhkmnm to the subjects, 
the experimenter completely controlled the dial movements, which 
were identical for the two subjects. Both subjects were led to 
believe that they were sexually aroused by certain pictures and not 
by others. Thus they were led to believe that they .had reacted to 
the picture in a manner contrary to their self-images by somehow 
producing homosexual responses. According to the hypothesis, the 
subjects in the favorable condition should expeiicxce more dissonance 
than the subjects in the unfavorable condition. If projection of an 
undesirable trait is a positive function of the magnitude of dissonance, 
then subjects in the favorable condition should project more homosexual 
arousal to others than those in the unfavorable condition. The
subjects whose self-evaluations had been raised did project more 
homosexual tendencies on others, and this projection apparently occurred 
in order to reduce dissonance, for there was more projection where 
dissonance fas high than where it was low.
The studies by Gerard and Brand involved ease of persuasibility 
in terns of cognitive dissonances arising from interpersonal relation­
ships. From these data it appears that high self-concept individuals 
tend to experience more cognitive dissonance than individuals with 
low evaluations of themselves. However these findings are contrary 
to popular conceptions about projection.
Stock (I9I4.9) analyzed client statements from tan cases and 
found that there is a definite relationship between the w y  an 
individual feels about himself and the way he feels about other
persons. Stock concluded that a person who holds negative feelings 
about himself tends to hold negative feelings toward other people 
in general, and as a person's feelings about himself change to positive,
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his fseiiugs about others change in a similar direction. And heurin^er 
did find that the suicidal and psychosomatic individuals did experience 
more cognitive dissonance than the normal subjects who were assumed 
to have the highest self-evaluations of the subjects in that study.
It seems to make sense that individuals who are self assured would be 
more tolerant of other people. It may well be that the suicidal and 
psychosomatic subjects in Neuringer*s study projected negative feelings 
they had for themselves into their evaluations of others. This could 
account for the fact that suicidals and psychosomatics had a more 
negative resultant feeling toward the ether person in the diadic 
relationships than did normals.
The writer feels that projection could play an important role 
in an individual's evaluation of the other person in diadic inter­
personal relationships. That is, It seems possible that .in achieving 
cognitive balance,, a person would attribute his characteristics 
(self-concept) to others. Thereby, a high self-concept individual 
would reason that if a good friend did something undesirable, he must 
have had a good reason for doing it, and the person would consequently 
not alter his good impression of the other person in the relationship. 
Instead he would achieve a balanced state by one of the other methods 
proposed by Heider. He could tell himself that the other person 
wasn't responsible for what he did or that what the other person did 
wasn't really bad. A person of low self-concept in a similar situation 
would project his lew self-concept onto the other person in the 
relationship and consequently reason that the person performing 
the undesirable act was a "bad" person. Therefore the other person 
in the relationship would be devaluated.
Similarly, in diadic situations where the initial relationship 
is unfriendly and she other person does something desirable, it seems 
that a high self-concept person would reason that the other person 
wasn't "all bad" and would consequently change his attitude toward 
him to a more favorable one. A low self-concept person, on tne other 
hand, would say the other person is still "bad" and would proceed to 
achieve cognitive balance by telling himself that the other individual 
wasn't responsible for the good tiling he did or that the action wasn’t 
really desirable.
II. THE PROBLEM
'The present study attempted to investigate the influence 
of self-concept on the resolution of cognitive dissonance in diadic 
relationships. In keeping with the reasoning that high self-concept 
individuals regain cognitive balance in such \ manner as to have
a more friendly resultant attitude toward the other person in the 
relationship than do low self-concept individuals, it was hypothesized 
that when cognitively dissonant information causing interpersonal
conflict was introduced, high self-concept individuals would change 
their attitudes less in friendly to unfriendly situations and more 
in unfriendly to friendly situations than would low self-concept 
individuals.
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III. METHOD
Subjects
The sixty-four subjects used in this study were the 16 males 
and lb females that scored highest and the lo males and 16 females 
that scored lowest on Column I of Bills' Inventory of Adjustment 
and Values (1958)* They were selected from a pool of 390 subjects 
enrolled in introductory psychology at the University of North 
Dakota the second semester of the 1962-63 school year.
Instruments and Procedure
Column I of Bills' Inventory of Adjustment and Values was 
administered to the subjects to obtain a measure of their self- 
concept. More information is available on the norms, reliability, 
and validity of this instrument than on any other measure of self- 
concept included in a survey of self-concept measures undertaken 
by Wylie (1961). The instrument consists of a ^9 word adjective 
checklist. The subjects used the adjectives to complete the
sentence, "I am a (an)__________  person," and then indicated by
the use of a five-point scale how much of the time this statement 
was like them. The negative traits were reversed and the ratings 
summed to yield each subject's self-score. This score represented 
the subject's concept of self and inferred M s  self-regard. Wylie 
(1961) reported the six-week test-retest reliability of self-scores to 
be +.90. Self-scores for the subjects ranged from 131 to 235* The 
16 males and 16 females with the highest scores were placed in the 
high self-concept group, and the lb males and 16 females with the 
lowest scores were placed in the low self-concept group. The Bills' 
Inventory of Adjustment and Values self-score ranges, means, and 
standard deviations for the four groups are presented in Table 1.
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TABLE 1
THE RANGES, MEAN SCORES, AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS EARNED BY THE 
MALE AND FEMALE HIGH AID LOW SELF-CONCEPT SUBJECTS ON COLUMN I OF 
BILLS' INVENTORY OF ADJUSTMENT AID VALUES
Male Female
High Self-concept RANGE 206-226 RANGE 214-235
M 214.93 M 220.56
S.D. 4.92 S.D. 5.90
Low Self-concept RANGE 131-169 RANGE 143-169
M 157.68 M 157.56
S.D. 11.82 S.D. 9.39
An independent sample t was computed between the mean self-scores of 
the males and females in the high self-concept groups. A t of 2.93 re­
sulted which, for 30 degrees of freedom, was significant at the .01 level. 
This indicated that a significant difference in self-scores existed 
between the high self-concept males and females. The female high self- 
concept subjects had significantly higher self-scores than the male 
high self-concept subjects. A t was also computed between the mean 
self-scores of the males and females in the low self-concept groups. A 
t of .03 resulted which, for 30 degrees of freedom, was not significant 
at the .10 level. This indicated that no significant difference in 
self-scores existed between the low self-concept males and females.
All the subjects were given a booklet containing ten hypothetical 
situations which were arranged in random order. In five of these 
situations it was arbitrarily established that an imaginary person 
was a good friend of the subject. This was done by a printed roam 
on a friendship scale. In the remaining five situations it was 
similarly established that the subject was on unfriendly oerms with 
an imaginary person. Then in each situation, disruptive material 
was introduced which was designed to cause the subjects to change
12
their attitude toward the imaginary person. The format of one of 
the situations was as follows:
"You are a good friend of X. An indication of the 
degree of friendship that you hold for him is 
shown ty the mai'ker on the scale below.
B'RIbNDSHIP SCALE
•______ . • • . 'I .
Very Quite Neutral Mildly Quite Very
unfriendly Unfriendly Friendly Friendly Friendly
One day you hear your friend saying things to your 
girl friend (or boy friend) which you don't like.
You are upset. Would you now rate the degree of 
friendship you hold for him on the FRIENDSHIP SCALE 
below. Please place a mark on the scale below which 
seems closest to your feelings about him now* You 
may place your checkmark anywhere along the scale."
» .______________•________ • . V »
Very Quite Neutral Mildly Quite Very
Unfriendly Unfriendly Friendly Friendly Friendly
The format for the four remaining situations where a friendly arbitrary 
relationship was established was identical except for the statements 
causing disruption of the original belief. These statements were:
(2) one day you find that your friend has been telling lies about 
jou to other people, (3 ) one day you hear your friend make several 
remarks about your mother which you strongly dislike, (4) one day 
you see your friend take candy from your little brother, and (5) one 
day you see your friend cheating on an exam. For the five situations 
in which an unfriendly arbitrary relationship was established, the 
disrupting statements were: (l) one day you see X helping your 
mother, who has fallen, to her feet, (2) one day you overhear X 
telling one of your instructors that you are an excellent student,
^3) one day you read in the paper that X volunteered to donate blood 
to a dying man, (4) one day X stops his car to help you fix a flat 
tire, and (5) one day you see X rescuing a child from the path of 
an oncoming car. Then for each subject, the difference between the 
pre-printed standard mark on the first scale and the rating made 
by the subject on the second scale was measured. This represented
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x.ne shift score for that situation. The shift scores were summed for 
each group on the Trien&ly to unfriendly and the unfriendly to friendly 
situations and a mean shift score for each group in each type of 
situation was calculated. The subjects were sold zo consider the 
person in each situation as being a different individual, but the 
order of presentation of the situations was randomly varied to insure 
control of the effects of any cumulative feeling toward the hypothetical 
person.
To get an indication of how subjects would change chair attitudes 
toward another person in a more lifelike situation, a four-scene 
motion picture was made shoing a person doing livable things in two 
scenes and unfriendly things in two other scenes. One of the friendly 
scenes showed a young woman picking up books for a second young 
woman, and the other friendly scene showed the same woman ope 'ng a 
door to let another person enter a building. One scene connoting 
unfriendly behavior showed the actress stealing a girl's purse, 
and the other unfriendly scene showed her pushing a boy off a curb.
As a check on the stimulus value of the film the four scenes 
were shown to undergraduate students in a child psychology class 
who were then asked to rate whether the actress's behavior was 
friendly or unfriendly. A seven-point rating scale was used, on 
which a rating of one represented very unfriendly behavior, and a 
rating of seven very friendly behavior. The means and standard 
deviations for the ratings of the four scenes are presented in 
Table 2.
To determine whether or not the students agreed on the ranking 
of the scenes and applied essentially the same standards in ranking 
them, eight rating sheets were randomly drawn and a Kendall Coefficient 
of Concordance (w) was computed. A W of «95^ resulted whic.n is 
significant beyond the .01 level. is indicates that the students 
did agree on their ratings of the four scenes and that the stimulus
message values were unambiguous.
The high and low self-concept subjects in the present study
were showju tne four s^ ciico • nali 
tc see the two unfriendly scenes
of each group were randomly dGj.u C 
first and the other subjects saw the
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TA3LE 2
MEAN RATINGS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF THE DEGREE 
OF FRIENDLINESS FOR EACH OF THE FOUR MOVIE SCENES, 
ON A SCALE OF "1” FOR VERY UNFRIENDLY TO "7" FOR
VERY FRIENDLY
M S.D.
Scene 1 1.70 1.14
Scene 2 l.6l .86
Scene 3 6.09 .70
Scene 4 6.66 .50
tvo friendly scenes first. After seeing the first two scenes, the 
subjects were ashed to rate the actress on a social distance scale.
The format of this scale was as follows:
"Using the following scale:
1. Yes
2. Probably
3* Don't know
4. Probably not
5 • No
as far as the individual seen in the first two sequences of the
movie is concerned, do you feel that you:
1. Would admit her to close kinship by marriage?_____
2. Would admit her to your group as a personal chum? ____
3 . Would admit her tc your street as a neighbor?....
4. Would admit her to your college as a fellow student?_____
After the first two scenes were rated, the remaining two scenes were 
shown to the subjects, and they again rated the actress on the social 
distance scale. The two ratings were summed separately and one 
difference in the tvo ratings each subject made constituted she attitude 
shift for that subject.
The ten hypothetical situations will be referred tc hereafter 
as the hypothetical situations and the filmed sequences will be 
referred to as the movie situations.
IV. RESULTS
The results indicated that in the hypothetical situations,, 
high self-concept subjects shifted their attitudes more than low 
self-concept subjects, regardless of sex or the direction (friendly 
to unfriendly or unfriendly to friendly) of the change. The results 
also indicated that in the hypothetical situations females shifted 
their attitudes more than males, regardless of their self-concept or 
the direction of the change. The results of the movie situations 
indicate that all subjects shifted their attitudes more in friendly 
to unfriendly situations than in unfriendly to friendly situations 
regardless of their sex or self-concept.
Hypothetical Situations
The mean shift scores and their standard deviations for the 
four groups of subjects on the hypothetical situations are presented 
in Table 3*
The highest mean shift score w s earned by the high self- 
concept females in both the friendly to unfriendly and unfriendly 
to friendly sequences. The lowest mean shift score was earned by 
the low self-concept males in both the friendly to unfriendly and 
unfriendly to friendly sequences. Further inspection of Table 3 
reveals that the largest obtained standard deviation was 35*62 and 
the smallest was 24.4-7. When these deviations are squared, they 
represent the largest and smallest variances. The ratio of these 
two variances was 2.12. This heterogeneity of variance is well 
within the limits of Norton’s study (cf. Lindquist, 1956). Norton 
found that the ratio of the largest to the smallest variance could 
be as large as 45, and the analysis of variance model would still 
provide meaningful significance tests. The analysis of variance
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TABL
THE MEAN SHIFT SCORES AND ACCOMPANYING STANDARD DEVIATIONS HADE EY THE 
MALE AND FEMALE HIGH AND LOW SELF-CONCEPT SUBJECTS ON THE FRIENDLY TO 
UNFRIENDLY AND UNFRIENDLY TO FRIENDLY HYPOTHETICAL SITUATIONS
Friendly to Unfriendly
Unfriendly to Friendly
High self-concept M 66.68 Mi* 72.66
Female
S.D. 35.62 S.D. 28.04
High self-concept M 80*61 Ml X 65.45
Male
S.D. 32.21 S.D. 24.47
Low sell’-concept M 63.35 M 64.01
Female
S.D. 33.51 S.D. 32.39
Low self-concept \-l 51.95 Ifn 59-92
Male
S.D. 32.66 S.D. 26.21
model could therefore be used meaningfully with data in the hypothetical 
situations part of the present study.
In order to test the significance of the attitude shifts for the 
four groups of subjects, an analysis of variance test based upon the 
model described by Lindquist, as Typo III "Mixed" design, was per­
formed. This design allows for tests of the Interactions of the 
variables as veil as tests of their main effects. The results of tills 
analysis are presented in Table 4.
All interactions were found to be non-significant. The main 
effect of self-concept resulted in an F ratio of 83.26, which was 
found to be significant beyond the .001 level. The high self-concept 
subjects exhibited significantly more attitude shift than the low 
self-concept subjects, regardless of sex or direction (friendly to 
unfriendly or unfriendly to friendly) of the change.
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TABLE 4
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF TIE SHIFT SCOPES 14ADE BY THE HALF AND FEMALE 
HIGH AND LOW SELF-CONCEPT SUBJECTS ON THE FRIENDLY 'TO UNFRIENDLY
a n d  unfriendly to f r ie n d l y hypothetical situations
Source of Variation df C C! ms F
Between-Subj e cts / 't-\ J 100^67 1596.62
Self-concept (high and low) 1 31257 34257 63*26*
Sex (Male and Female) 1 81400 41400 100.61*
Self-concept x Sex 1 242 242 *59
Error (b) 6o 24686 411.47
Within-Subjects S VOf 1457342 22770.97
Direction (friendly to unfriendly 1 16964 I8964 • 79
and unfriendly to friendly)
Direction x Self-concept i 241 dh’ 1. • c
Direction x Sex 1 I.89I 1891 .08
Direction x Sell'-concept x Sex 1 ocry*> 3592 *15
Error (w) 6o 1432654 23377*37
t o t a l -U: (
^Significant Beyond .001 level
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The main effect of Bex resulted in an F ratio of 100.6l, which 
was found to be significant beyond the .001 level. The female subjects 
exhibited significantly more attitude shift than male subjects., regard­
less of self-concept or direction of the change.
Combined means illustrating the main effects of self-concept 
and sex in the hypothetical situations, are presented in Tables 5 
and 6 respectively.
TA3j
COMBINED SHIFT SCORES FOR THE HIGH SELF-CONCEPT AUD LOW C. 
SUBJECTS ON THE HYPOTHETICAL SITUATIONS
IF-CONCEPT
High self-concept .Low self-concept
M 66.36 59.81
SD 30.67 32 .11
TABLE 6
COMBINED MEAN SHIFT’ SCORES FOR THE MALES AND FEMALES 
ON THE HYPOTHETICAL SITUATIONS
Male Female
M 66.68
SD 29.97 32.72
Movie Situations
The mean shift scores and their standard deviations for the 
four groups of subjects in the movie situations are presented in 
Table 7*
The highest mean shift score was obtained by the high self- 
concept males in the friendly to unfriendly sequence and the lowest 
mean shift score was obtained by the low self-concept females in the
unfriendly to friendly sequence. The mean shift scores were larger
for all groups on the friendly to unfriendly sequence than on the 
unfriendly to friendly sequence.
TAILS 7
THE MEAN SHIFT SCORES AND ACCOMPANYING STANDARD DEVIATIONS MADE BY THE 
MALE AND FEMALE HIGH AND LOW SELF-CONCEPT SUBJECTS ON THE FRIENDLY TO 
UNFRIENDLY AND Ul'TFRIENDLl TO FRIENDLY MGVTS SITUATIONS
Friendly to 
Unfriendly
Unfriendly 
to Friendly
High self-concept M 5.88 M 4.12
Female
3.D. I • 3 1 S.D. 3-59
High self-concept M 8.75 M 4.25
Male
S.D. 2.61 S.D. 2.99
Low self-concept M 8.00 M 3.12
Female
S.D. 2.24 S.D. 3 .I8
Low self-concept M 8.12 M 0 oz
Male
S.D. 2.26 O <* i.) <* 1.98
Further inspection of 'Table 7 reveals that the largest obtained
standard deviation vac 3 .5s ad the smallest vac 1.37* When these
deviations vere squared to yield the largest and smallest variance, 
the ratio of the variances was 6.36, which is well within the limits 
of Norton's stud;/ (Lindquist, 1956).
In order to test the significance of the attitude shifts in the
movie situations for the various treatment combinations, a 2 x 2 x 2 
analysis of variance was performed. This design allows for tests of 
the interactions of the variables as well as tests of their main
effects. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 6.
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TABLE 6
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF THE SHIFT SCORES MADE BY THE MALE AND FEMALE 
HIGH AND LOW SELF-CONCEPT SUBJECTS OK TIE FRIENDLY 'TO UNFRIENDLY 
AND UNFRIENDLY TO FRIENDLY MOVIE SITUATIONS
Source of Variation df S3 ms •qi
Direction (friendly to unfriendly 1 
and unfriendly to friendly)
256 256 33.20*
Self-concept (high and low) 1 ,25 *25 *03
Sex (Male and Female) Ta. lO.pO iu.?o I .36
Direction x Self-concept 1 12=25 12.25 ■t r- cyx.^o
Direction x Sex 1 7*56 7.56 .98
Self-concept x Sex 1 7.56 7.56 .98
Direction x Self-concept x Sex 1 7*57 *57 .98
Within-Cells 56 432 7*71
TOTAL 63
♦Significant beyond .001 level
Ail interactions were found to be non-significant. The ma.in
effect of direction resulted in an F ratio of 33*20, indicating
significance beyond the .001 level. All the subjects shifted the ir
attitudes significantly more in friendly to unfriendly situations
than in situations going from unfriendly to friendly.
Combined means illustrating the main effect of direction are 
presented in Table 9*
d~  -i_
table: 9
COMBINED MEAN SHIFT SCORES FOR ALL THE SUBJECTS FOR THE FRIENDLY TO 
UNFRIENDLY AND UNFRIENDLY TO FRIENDLY SEQUENCES ON MOVIE SITUATIONS
Friendly to Unfriendly Unfriendly to Friendly
M 7-69 3.68
SD 2.41 3.04
V. DISCUSSION
The lesults of this study did not support the hypothesis 
that high self-concept individuals would more often resolve their 
cognitive dissonance in such a manner as to have a more friendly 
resultant attitude towards the other person in a diadic relationship 
than low self-concept individuals.
In the hypothetical situations, it appears that the high self- 
concept subjects shifted their attitudes more than the low self-concept 
subjects regardless of the direction of shift.
The fact that female subjects shifted their attitudes significantly 
more than male subjects lends support to the common finding that females 
are more persuasible than males. (Cason, 1925, Roach, lQUl) In 
addition, this sex difference may also have been due to the high self- 
concept females having earned significantly higher self-scores than 
the high self-concept males, and thus experiencing more dissonance 
than the high self-concept males, leading to greater shifts in attitude.
It appears that high self-concept individuals comply with a 
persuasive communication that induces attitude change, making them more 
persuasible than low self-concept individuals. Therefore, it would 
seem-that a technique designed to effect maximal change of attitude 
would be most effective with high self-concept individuals, if these 
individuals could be induced to consider information which is discrepant 
with their conceptions of themselves. If this conjecture has any 
basis in fact, techniques advocating attitude change such as political 
indoctrination, brainwashing, and psychotherapy, could be expected 
to be most effective with high self-concept individuals rather than 
chronic self-doubters. This implies that perhaps a first step in 
attempts to effect attitude change should be an enhancement of the 
individual’s self-concept. It appears that maximal attitude change 
could be achieved with high self-concept females and the least change 
with low self-concept m°les.
It may be that high self-concept Individuals are more righteous 
in their perceptions of others than are low self-concept individuals 
(i.e., when a high self-concept person is confronted with information 
which is discrepant with his previous opinion about another person, 
he will change his attitude toward the other person in light of the 
new information, more than would a low self-concept person). Low 
self-concept individuals, on the other hand, appear not to be upset 
by fluctuations in interpersonal relationships. One could speculate 
that they accept these changes as something that "always happens to 
them" or by telling themselves "that's the way people are," and thus 
experience little dissonance when they occur.
In the movie situations both groups shifted more easily in 
the friendly to unfriendly situations than in the diverse direction.
It is interesting that the difference in attitude change was signifi­
cantly related to the direction of the change. All subjects were more 
willing to shift their attitudes toward the actress from friendly to 
unfriendly than they were to credit her with "good" characteristics
if the initial impression was poor. Thus, from the results of the 
movie data analysis, it appears that, in lifelike situations, people 
are more prone to change a good initial impression to an unfavorable 
one, than to change an initially bad impression to a more favorable 
one. This may explain the common observation that people have difficulty 
living down bad reputations. Furthermore, this finding suggests that 
people will finally became disenchanted with the "charming" psycho­
pathic individual if undesirable acts are performed.
A question arises concerning why differences in attitude shifts 
due to self-concept were not found in the movie situations. It may be 
that the stimulus conditions did not arouse cognitive dissonance as 
well as in tire hypothetical situations. V/hy this should be is not 
understood by the author. It may be possible that dissonance is more 
easily aroused in interpersonal relationships which are already
established than in situations where impressions uf personality
are being initially formed.
The findings for the hypothetical situations are in agreement 
with the theorizing by Brehm and Cohen in regard to dissonance 
reduction and attitude change, as well as with the case studies cited
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by White (1952). He presents the case of Joseph Kidd, an individual 
who has a very poor conception of himself and whose personality is so 
resistant to change that he finds it extremely difficult no be flexible 
in his relationships with other people. On the other hand, in the 
case of Hartley Hale, there is a presentation of a person with a 
very good conception of himself, who exhibits a great deal, of 
independence, tull changes his attitudes with ease.
The findings in this study are consonant with the reports of 
Festinger, Schachter, and Back (1950), Gerard (cf. Brehm & Cohen,
1962) and Bramel (1962). These studies seem to point to the position 
that people with high self-concepts have difficulty being tolerant 
of their fellow men.
It may be a myth that people who have a good opinion of themselves 
are more tolerant of others. Self-concept research (Lowe, 1961) has 
focused mainly on relating the level of self appraisal to test scores 
of pathology (Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale, Rorschach, Thematic 
Apperception Test, Minnesota Multiphasic personality Inventory, etc.) 
and not to how people get along with each other.
VI. SUMMARY
This study was concerned with the influence of self-concept 
on the resolution of cognitive dissonance arising in interpersonal 
relationships. The subjects, introductory psychology students, 
were presented with ten hypothetical situations, five in which 
an imaginary person who was arbitrarily established as being a good 
friend of the subject, did something ’undesirable, and five in which 
a person who was arbitrarily on unfriendly terms with the subject, 
did something desirable. Tire subjects were then asked to rate their 
degree of friendship for the imaginary person. The study was repeated 
using filmed sequences instead of hypothetical situations.
It was hypothesized that high self-concept subjects would change 
their attitudes in both friendly to unfriendly and unfriendly to 
friendly situations in such a way as to allow them to have a better 
final regard for the other person in the relationship than low self- 
concept subjects. This would be manifested by lesser attitude shifts 
by high self-concept subjects in friendly to unfriendly situations and 
greater shifts by high self-concept subjects in unfriendly to friendly- 
situations.
The results were analyzed using a design described by Lindquist 
as a Type III "Mixed" design for the hypothetical situations, and a 
2 x 2 x 2 factorial design for the movie situations.
'Tiie results of the analyses did not support the hypotheses 
advanced in this study and the findings were different for the 
hypothetical situations and movie situations. It was found that 
in the hypothetical situations, high self-concept subjects shifted 
their attitudes significantly more than low self-concept subjects.
This finding was discussed in the light of its support of recent 
theorizing by Brehm and Cohen on the relationship between self-concept, 
cognitive dissonance, and attitude change.
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It was also found in the hypothetical situations, that female 
suojeots shifted their attitudes signlficantly more than male subjects.
The analysis of the attitude shifts in the movie situations 
revealed that all subjects were more prone in lifelike situations, 
to change a good impression of the other person to an unfavorable 
one than to change a bad impression to a more favorable one.
The implications of this study are (1) the recent theorizing 
by Brebza and Cohen on the relationship between cognitive dissonance, 
self-concept, and attitude, change appears to be valid, (2) techniques 
advocating attitude change can be expected to oe more effective with 
high self-concept individuals than with low self-concept individuals, 
provided the individuals can be induced to consider information
discrepant with their conception of themselves, (3) high self-concept
individuals appear to be more righteous in their perception of others 
than are low self-concept individuals, and f) it appears to be 
important to do desirable things and avoid doing undesirable things in 
establishing a friendly interpersonal x'elationship with another person.
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